We develop a simple framework for analyzing the optimal design of leniency programs, which allow cartel members to denounce their collusive agreements. We highlight a basic trade-off between two opposite forces: leniency can destabilize cartels, by encouraging firms to report and bring evidence to the antitrust authority, but it can also reduce the expected penalties that cartel members face. W...

The value VF,n(a0, . . . , an, b) = a0 + a1b+ a2b 2 + · · ·+ anb of a polynomial of degree n ≥ 1 over a field F can be computed by Horner’s rule using no more than nmultiplications in F , and it is optimal (for many fields, including the reals R and the complexes C) for the number of multiplications and/or divisions required, cf. Pan [1966], Winograd [1967, 1970]. We show that Horner’s rule is ...

A rule-based program will return a set of answers to each query. An impure program , which includes the Prolog cut \!" and \not()" operators, can return diierent answers if its rules are reordered. There are also many reasoning systems that return only the rst answer found for each query; these rst answers, too, depend on the rule order, even in pure rule-based systems. A theory revision algori...

Some specific characteristics of innovation (such as vertical product differentiation, the strategic role of technological standards or the quasi public good nature of technological knowledge) introduce additional complexity to the standard problem of the mismatch between investment projects and financial resources needed to realise them. Does an optimal design of rules and intermediaries to ta...

Let X1,X2, . . . be and i.i.d. sequence. We consider three stopping rule problems for stopping the sequence of partial sums, Sn = ∑n 1 Xi, each of which has a timeinvariance for the payoff that allows us to describe the optimal stopping rule in a particularly simple form, depending on one or two parameters. For certain distributions of the Xn, the optimal rules are found explicitly. The three p...

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

This paper studies optimal persuasion. A speaker must decide which arguments to present and a listener which arguments to accept. Communication is limited in that the arguments available to the speaker depend on her information. Optimality is assessed from the listener’s perspective assuming that the listener can commit to a persuasion rule. I show that this seemingly simple scenario–introduced...