The Quine-Putnam Indispensability argument is the argument for treating mathematical entities on a par with other theoretical entities of our best scientific theories. This argument is usually taken to be an argument for mathematical realism. In this chapter I will argue that the proper way to understand this argument is as putting pressure on the viability of the marriage of scientific realism...

Some historical-philosophical preliminaries This paper is going to outline the innovative semantic theories of the two great 14century nominalist thinkers whose work eventually gave rise to the quasi-institutional separation of the nominalist via moderna, the “modern way”, from the realist via antiqua, “the old way” of doing logic, science, philosophy, and theology in the late Middle Ages. The ...

In this paper, I argue that various disputes in ontology have important ramifications and so are worth taking seriously. I employ a criterion according to which whether a dispute matters depends on how integrated it is with the rest of our theoretical projects. Disputes that arise from previous tensions in our theorizing and have additional implications for other issues matter, while insular di...

In this paper, I argue that all expressions for abstract objects are meaningless. My argument closely follows David Lewis’ against the intelligibility of certain theories possible worlds, but modifies it in order to yield a general conclusion about language pertaining objects. If my Lewisian is sound, not only can we know exist, cannot even refer or think them. However, while strongly motivates...

Katz 's new clothes Katz's new view about language and linguistics comes in two parts: platonism and nonreductionism. Those of us who have been skeptical about the empirical basis for claims that have arisen from within linguistics will welcome Katz's defection to our side in respect of platonism, but we will be dismayed by his refusal to adopt the rest of our methodology concerning reductionis...

Abstract Nominalists need some account of correctness for sentences committed to the existence abstract objects. This paper proposes a new statement such conditions specifically properties. The builds on an earlier proposal mine, but avoids counter-examples against latter pointed out by Thomas Schindler, particularly, sentence ‘There are inexpressible properties’. I argue that is independently ...