Economic concerns for equity have motivated game theorists to study envy-free mechanisms. Though not incentive compatible, these mechanisms implement in Nash equilibria efficient allocations at which no agent prefers the consumption of any other agent to their own. In experimental allocation decisions between two players, an envy-free first-price auction achieves similar efficiency and far grea...

We employ a stylized model of the electricity industry to examine the effects of restructuring on capacity investments, retail prices and welfare, allowing for uncertain demand. We consider the following market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) separated duopoly with wholesale trade. We find that generators install sufficient capaci...

An instance of the max k−cut game is an edge weighted graph. Every vertex is controlled by an autonomous agent with strategy space [1..k]. Given a player i, his payoff is defined as the total weight of the edges [i, j] such that player j’s strategy is different from player i’s strategy. The social welfare is defined as the weight of the cut, i.e. half the sum of the players payoff. It is known ...

We discuss the implications of two price zones, i.e. one northern and southern bidding area, on the German electricity market. In the northern zone, continuous capacity additions with low variable costs cause large regional supply surpluses in the market dispatch while conventional capacity decreases in the southern zone. As the spatial imbalance of supply and load is increasing, the current si...

The celebrated PPAD hardness result for finding an exact Nash equilibrium in a two-player game initiated a quest for finding approximate Nash equilibria efficiently, and is one of the major open questions in algorithmic game theory. We study the computational complexity of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with good social welfare. Hazan and Krauthgamer and subsequent improvements showe...

We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a s...

There are many factors that influence the day-ahead market bidding strategies of a generation company (GenCo) within the framework of the current energy market. Environmental policy issues are giving rise to emission limitation that are becoming more and more important for fossil-fueled power plants, and these must be considered in their management. This work investigates the influence of the e...

We study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences using the concept of undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e. Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. We show that this mild refinement of Nash equilibrium has a dramatic impact on the set of implementable correspondences. Our main result is that if there are at least three agents in the society, then any co...

The standard economic model of efficient competitive markets relies on the ability of sellers to charge prices that vary as their costs change. Yet, there is no restructured electricity market in which most retail customers can be charged realtime prices (RTP), prices that can change as frequently as wholesale costs. We analyze the impact of having some share of customers on time-invariant pric...