A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information among the controllers makes it difficult to compute or characterize Nash equilibria. Using common information among the controllers, the game with asymmetric...

An equitable risk allocation between contracting parties plays a vital role in enhancing the performance of the project. This research presents a new quantitative risk allocation approach by integrating fuzzy logic and bargaining game theory. Owing to the imprecise and uncertain nature of players’ payoffs at different risk allocation strategies, fuzzy logic is implemented to determine the value...

In this paper we focus on non-cooperative two-player linear-state differential games. In the standard definition this family is introduced assuming that there is no multiplicative interaction among state and control variables. In this paper we show that a multiplicative interaction between the state and the control of one player does not destroy the analytical features of the linear-state diffe...

We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately imp...

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population d...

This paper is considering the competition between two multi-echelon supply-chains on price and service under balance and imbalance of market power between the chains which are analyzing through Nash and Stackelberg game approach. The problem is categorized as the centralized or decentralized structure of each chain, which means a few different possible scenarios are developing based on the Nash...

1. We proved that in any game for which there exists a jointly-differentially private algorithm for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium, there exists a corresponding mediated game in which “good behavior” (using the mediator, truthfully reporting your type to it, and then faithfully following its suggestion) forms an ex-post Nash equilibrium, and that the resulting play forms a Nash equil...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a silent game oí timing. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium. The strategies of the Nash equilibrium are explicitly given. KEYWOR~s: Nash equilibrium, Game of timing. 'The author is financally supported by the Netherland Organisation for Scientific R,esearch (NWO). I thank Peter Borm, Eric van Damme, Feico Drost,...

Potential games are games with potential functions. Technically, the potential function defines a refinement concept. We provide justification for this refinement concept using the notion of robustness of equilibria. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game h...

We consider the following abstraction of competing publications. There are n players in the game. Each player i chooses a point xi in the interval [0, 1], and a player’s payoff is the distance from its point xi to the next larger point, or to 1 if xi is the largest. For this game, we give a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium for the two-player game, and, more important, we give a...