My aim in this paper is to provide some introductory coordinates aiming at orienting a unified discourse on the doctrine of vagueness Peirce. After tracing stages Peircean scholarship that have brought concept into focus, I will show vagueness, as it appears philosophy, three-dimensional concept. Thus, while logical-semiotic dimension – and more specifically problem related quantification subje...

∗I would like to thank the editors Kathrin and Peter and an anonymous reviewer of Philosophy Compass for suggestions to improve the final version. Further thanks go to my colleagues Paul Egré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij and the Australian philosopher and paraconsistent logician Dominic Hyde for discussion and comments at different stages. Thanks also to Pablo Visiers. This work was done ...

This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a ...

I shall argue that vagueness, understood as a semantic phenomenon, can be accommodated within standard semantics by assimilating it to contingency in standard modal semantics and suitably modifying the pragmatics. I claim that vagueness in natural language is not a defect and that accommodating it is therefore obligatory for semantic frameworks for natural languages. In section 17.2, I interpre...

We report results of an experiment in which participants provided certainty equivalents for 15 risky or vague (with imprecise probabilities) two-outcome gambles. Participants made their decisions in three different settings: a) individually without prior social interactions, b) individually after discussing decisions with other participants and c) in groups of three. We also manipulated the deg...

The philosophical account of vagueness I call “transvaluationism” makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought-content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phen...