Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the issues involved in managerial control and managerial identity in relation to the idea of a post-bureaucratic organization. In addition it introduces the papers in this special issue. Design/methodology/approach The paper identifies the increasing complexity of issues of managerial control and managerial identity that arise from ...

This paper provides direct evidence that managerial style is a key determinant of the firm’s cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method by Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999) to a large sample that tracks job movement of top managers, we find that managerial style is a critical factor that explains a large part of the variation in loan contr...

We present a formal model of how the size of a firm’s administrative staff depends on the environment in which it operates. We consider a monopolist that introduces a new product in the face of market uncertainty. In a model that incorporates an informationprocessing view of the managerial hierarchies into a product choice problem, we relate optimal size of organizations to the speed of change ...

According to the widely used Managerial Power Model, a higher hierarchical position with associated higher power leads to higher compensation. In contrast, the Compensating Wage Differentials Model argues that there is a non-positive relationship between positional power and total compensation. Both power and income yield utility and in equilibrium managers are prepared to trade-off the two ele...

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Managerial opportunism is commonly considered as destructive for the parties involved in an agency relationship. Using a formulation close to Jensen and Meckling’s equity model, we consider an agency relationship between a manager and an investor. The latter is assumed to benefit from a market power in terms of external funding opportunities. For high values of the prevailing rate of interest, ...