Password-based encrypted key exchange are protocols that are designed to provide pair of users communicating over an unreliable channel with a secure session key even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. In this paper, we present two simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols based on that of Bellovin and Merritt. While one pr...

The authentication key exchange protocol enables communication participants to authenticate each other and agree on the session key over an insecure public network. Recently, a three-party authentication key exchange protocol based on Elliptic curve cryptograph is proposed. In this paper, we improve the three-party encrypted key exchange protocol by bilinear maps. The proposed threeparty authen...

This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be highly efficient, since they do not requi...

One way to use Diffie-Hellman’s 1976 secret key exchange protocol is to create a key to be used in later rounds for symmetric encryption. This requires multiple rounds of communication. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1978 developed the one round communication scheme discussed earlier. Namely, in order for Bob to receive messages Bob produces an integer N = pq where p and q are primes of equal l...

Protocols for authenticated key exchange allow parties within an insecure network to establish a common session key which can then be used to secure their future communication. In this paper we introduce a protocol for distributed key agreement over a noncommutative ring with a large number of noninvertible elements. This protocol uses polynomials with coefficients in the center of the ring. We...

Many authentication and key exchange protocols are built using an accepted set of standard concepts such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, nonces to avoid replay, certificates from an accepted authority, and encrypted or signed messages. We introduce a basic framework for deriving security protocols from such simple components. As a case study, we examine the structure of a family of key exchange...

This paper investigates the two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) with perfect forward security. Currently, there exist no authenticated key exchange protocols which are provably secure in eCK model and meanwhile achieve perfect forward security against active adversary in one round. We propose a new two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol whic...

This paper introduces a new scheme, called Augmented Password AKE (APAKE), for authenticated key exchange protocols. In APAKE, a password is represented by a pair of values that is randomly selected in a huge space. We present an APAKE protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks including off-line dictionary attack and server compromise allowing for subsequent off-line dictionary attac...

Recently, M. Abdalla et al. proposed a slightly different variant of AuthA, based on the scheme proposed by E. Bresson et al., and provided the first complete proof of forward-secrecy for AuthA. They claimed that under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption the variant of AuthA was forward-secure in the random-oracle model. In this paper, we present an active attack to reveal a previously unpublishe...

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Abstract This memo describes a key-exchange method for the Se...