An example of a sender-receiver game, due to Farrell, is studied to illustrate the role of incentive constraints in the design of optimal communication systems between rational individuals whose interests are not the same. Some noise in the communication system is essential for substantive communication. Informational and strategic incentive constraints are linear, so finding an optimal incenti...

Crowdsourcing is a favorable computing paradigm for processing computer-hard tasks by harnessing human intelligence. However, generic crowdsourcing systems may lead to privacy-leakage through the sharing of worker data. To tackle this problem, we propose novel approach, called iFedCrowd (incentive-boosted Federated Crowdsourcing), manage privacy and quality projects. allows participants locally...

In this paper, we introduce the concept of dynamic pricing within the context of our previous Stackelberg network game model and view the ISP’s policy as an incentive policy, and the underlying game as a reverse Stackelberg game. We study this incentive-design problem under complete information as well as incomplete information. In both cases, we show that the game is not generally incentive co...

Identifying What Does What for Brain Mechanisms of Outcome Utilities 330 Brain Mesolimbic Dopamine: Anticipated/Predicted Utility or Pure Decision Utility? 330 Berridge’s Incentive Salience Theory: Dopamine as Pure Decision Utility 331 Incentive Salience “Wanting” versus Ordinary Wanting 331 Computational Modeling of Incentive Salience as Decision Utility 333 Applications of Incentive Salience ...

We consider locally incentive compatible mechanisms with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility. We identify a rich class of type spaces, which includes the single peaked type space, where local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility. Our main result shows that in such type spaces, a mechanism is locally incentive compatible and payment-onl...

Previous research suggests that pigeons and rats show differences in their behavioral adjustments in spaced-trial, incentive-downshift situations. Also, Papini and Pellegrini [Papini, M.R., Pellegrini, S., 2006. Scaling relative incentive value in consummatory behavior. Learn. Motiv. 37, 357-378] and Pellegrini and Papini [Pellegrini, S., Papini, M.R., 2007. Scaling relative incentive value in ...

Risk-shifting incentive problem in financial contracting, which typically arises in the context of a lenderborrower relationship, stands for the borrower’s incentive to influence the risk of his project. Thus, the borrower can increase the value of his payoff at the expense of the lender. However, the lender also may have a risk incentive under some circumstances so that he may render it diffic...