In this paper, we show that Bresson-Chevassut-Essiari-Pointcheval’s group key agreement scheme does not meet the main security properties: implicit key authentication, forward secrecy, and known key security. Also, we propose an improved version which fixes the security flaws found in the scheme.

Many emerging interactive and collaborative applications use the peer-to-peer paradigm nowadays. In every-day life peer-to-peer meetings of small groups are dominant, e.g. for business talks. Confidentiality is of primary concern in this context to provide group privacy. To assure confidentiality the partners have to agree upon a secret group key for encrypting their communication. This require...

In 2012, Piao et al. proposed a polynomial-based key management for secure intra-group and inter-group communication. In this notes, we point out that there are some security weaknesses of Piao et al.’s intra-group key distribution scheme. One main problem is that their scheme cannot prevent a group member to obtain other members’ secret keys shared with the controller. In addition, their schem...

This paper presents group key distribution techniques for highly mobile, volatile and hostile wireless networks in tactical situations (e.g., anti-terrorist operations, battle fields). The techniques proposed here are based on the self-healing key distribution methods (with revocation capability) recently developed by Staddon et al. [37]. By introducing a novel personal key distribution techniq...

Group key transfer protocols allow multiple parties to share a common secret key. They rely on a mutually trusted key generation center (KGC) that selects the key and securely distributes it to the authorized participants. Recently, Sun et al. proposed an authenticated group key transfer protocol based on secret sharing that they claim to be secure. We show that this is false: the protocol is s...

In this paper, we show that Bresson-Chevassut-Essiari-Pointcheval’s group key agreement scheme does not meet the main security properties: implicit key authentication, forward secrecy, and known key security. Also, we propose an improved version which fixes the security flaws found in the scheme.

Group key exchange protocols allow their participants to compute a secret key which can be used to ensure security and privacy for various multi-party applications. The resulting group key should be computed through cooperation of all protocol participants such that none of them is trusted to have any advantage concerning the protocol’s output. This trust relationship states the main difference...

1570-8705/$ see front matter 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2013.05.009 ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L. Veltri), simone.cirani@unipr. it (S. Cirani), [email protected] (S. Busanelli), gianluigi. [email protected] (G. Ferrari). 1 Iolus [6] for example, is a scheme that interferes with the packet stream, si...

This book gives an introduction to group key management protocols in different network settings. It can be recommended to early researchers in the areas of group key management, secure multicast and secure communication in sensor networks. The book discusses various security issues in group communications in a network-aware approach. However, it fails to show how to rigorously analyze group key...

Usually in a password-authenticated group key exchange protocols, all group members have the same password. However, the setting where all clients share the same password is not always practical. In this paper, we will introduce a new group key exchange protocol with different member having different password. Meanwhile we will prove its security in the standard model.