A decision maker is frequently confronted with fuzzy constraints, fuzzy utility maximization, and fuzziness about the state of competitors. In this paper we present a framework for fuzzy decision-making, using techniques from fuzzy logic, game theory, and micro-economics. In the first part, we study the rationality of fuzzy choice. We introduce fuzzy constraints, and show that this can easily b...

A compact representation for non-transferable utility games founding on answer set programming is proposed. The representation is fully expressive, in that it can capture all games defined over a finite set of alternatives. Moreover, due to the knowledge representation capabilities of answer set programs, it can easily accommodate the definition of games within a wide range of application domai...

Abstract This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions cooperative games with transferable utility. notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on domain of convex games. Moreover, we all nonempty satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak consistency, and converse consistency. family...

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. Solutions for such graph games can be obtained by applying standard solutions to a modified or restricted game that takes account of the cooperation restrictions. We discuss Harsanyi solutions wh...

Abstract In this paper we extend the equal division and surplus values for transferable utility cooperative games to more general setup of with level structures. case value propose three possible extensions, one which has already been described in literature. We provide axiomatic characterizations considered, apply them a particular cost sharing problem compare framework such an application.

Starting from her home, a service provider visits several customers, following a predetermined route, and returns home after all customers are visited. The problem is to …nd a fair allocation of the total cost of this tour among the customers served. A transferableutility cooperative game can be associated with this cost allocation problem. We introduce a new class of games, which we refer as t...

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for fini...

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents, the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents and the per capita nucleolus. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solu...

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it an O...