This paper reviews the Latin American experience with highway privatization during the last decade. Using evidence from Argentina, Colombia and Chile, we find that private financing of new highways freed up fewer public resources than expected because public funds were often diverted to bail out franchise holders. Furthermore, our review of the evidence suggests that pervasive contract renegoti...

an important determinant of health system performance is contracting. providers often respond to financial incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft contracts to influence performance. yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. arguably, in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual innovation may occur...

Business contracts are the key governing mechanism for inter-organizational collaboration and they are increasingly taking a central role in e-commerce, e-business and extended enterprise governance related to key process integration, exchange of knowledge and information and as drivers for performance. This research is motivated by the critical problem of stark incompatibility between the cont...

Contractual moralists, such as Bowie and Donaldson, have argued that contractual agreement explains why corporations a moral obligation towards the society in which they operate. They argue corporation’s emerges from hypothetical social contract establishes its legitimacy to operate society. Their assumption appears indicate logically necessary relationship between corporation. We there i...

The actual construction time and cost of construction projects may be affected by the client, project and contractual characteristics and in many cases can be very different from the contract time and cost. In this paper, details of 93 Australian construction projects are used to develop several models for actual construction time and cost prediction. A forward crossvalidation regression analys...

T complexity and scope of outsourced information technology (IT) demands relationship-specific investments from vendors, which, when combined with contract incompleteness, may result in underinvestment and inefficient bargaining, referred to as the holdup problem. Using a unique data set of over 100 IT outsourcing contracts, we examine whether contract extensiveness, i.e., the extent to which f...