We investigate the effect of sequential commitment in the decentralized newsvendor model with price-dependent demand. Sequential commitment allows the self-profit maximizing parties to commit to contract parameters (e.g., wholesale price, retail price, buyback price and order quantity) sequentially and alternately, and we investigate its effect on the equilibrium profits of the channel and its ...

We consider which factors determined the price–rent ratio for the housing market in 18 U. S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and at the national level over the period of 1975– 2014. Based on a present-value framework, our proposed empirical model separates the price–rent ratio for a given market into unobserved components related to the expected real rent growth and the expected housing r...

We study the problem of optimal gas storage valuation under a high-dimensional multifactor price model. The problem is modeled as a Markov decision process which leads to a stochastic version of the popular rolling intrinsic value. We show that the rolling intrinsic solution is optimal for the case of extreme risk aversion when using the nested conditional value-at-risk. We solve the problem by...

The paper investigates price dynamics under market liberalization, with a focus on the effects of lowering price floors. We analyze price dynamics by specifying and estimating a dynamic Tobit model under time-varying volatility, where the market price is censored by a government-set support price. The model is applied to the U.S. butter market over the last three decades. The econometric result...

The paper investigates price dynamics under market liberalization, with a focus on the effects of lowering price floors. We analyze price dynamics by specifying and estimating a dynamic Tobit model under time-varying volatility, where the market price is censored by a government-set support price. The model is applied to the U.S. butter market over the last three decades. The econometric result...

We model cheating in second price auctions when valuations of bidders are affiliated. Bidders predict cheating behavior by an unfair seller who can observe the bids submitted by all bidders and then submits his extra bid to increase the payment of the winning bidder. We derive a symmetric equilibrium strategy in the cheating model. Moreover, we conduct a numerical analysis to compare a second p...

This paper investigated the reaction of aggregate commodity market to oil price shocks and also explored the effects of oil price shocks on China's fundamental industries: metals, petrochemicals, grains and oilfats. We separated the volatilities of oil price into expected, unexpected and negatively expected categories to identify how oil prices influence bulk commodity markets. We contrasted th...

In auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it, revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price auctions without commitment results. When the time between auctions goes to zero, seller expected revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price. With many bidders, the seller equi...