Abstract We propose a novel housing market model to explore the effectiveness of rent control. Our reveals that expectation formation and learning behavior boundedly rational homebuyers, switching between extrapolative regressive rules subject their past forecasting accuracy, may create endogenous dynamics. show policymakers use control reduce level, although such policies have undesirable effe...

Despite the established link between oil rent fluctuations and remittances received, its plausible joint effect on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains unexplored. To fill this gap, first we determine whether natural resource (composed of rent, forest gas rent) reduces SSA. Second, examine positive macroeconomic signals such as mitigate negative rents a sample 43 SSA countries sp...

Guerriero, Carmine—The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states The determinants of incentive regulation are an important issue in economics. More powerful rules relax allocative distortions at the cost of lower rent extraction. Hence, they should be found where the reformer is more concerned with stimulating investments by granting higher expected profits, ...

Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Rent Seeking, Alliances, Raising Rivals’ Costs (Even Lowering One’s Own?), and Interjurisdictional Competition This paper offers an eclectic survey of the political economy of labor regulation in the United States at federal and state levels along the dimensions of occupational health and safety, unjust dismissal, right-to-work,...

Morals by Agreement contained a distinctive theory of economic justice alongside its theory of moral obligation. That theory involved the principle that individuals were entitled to the full fruits of their labour in situations of isolated production, but not in situations where social cooperation was needed for production. In the latter case, factor rent was to be included in the cooperative s...

Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent's services under incomplete information as to her outside option (location). This renders the agent's participation decision probabilistic from the perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade-off between participation probability and incentives. Rent and effort ...

This paper studies state failure and governance in two conflict-states in the Middle East: Iraq and Somalia. Iraq is currently undergoing a social experiment under which a new form of government is being constructed after the passage of autocratic rule. The government envisaged is a consociational democratic state designed a priori as a political mechanism for the redistribution of resources, m...

We use a unique firm-level panel data set of multinational parents and their foreign affiliates to analyze whether profits are shared across borders within multinational firms. Using both fixed-effects and generalized method-of-moments estimators, affiliate wage levels are estimated to respond to both affiliate and parent profitability. The elasticity of affiliate wages to parent profits per wo...

This paper suggests that current research on international business should provide for a more prominent role of Politics in its analysis. International research examines transactions that reach across national borders, yet nations and their borders have so far not been sufficiently operationalized to be integrated into a more comprehensive analysis. I draw on an existing paper by Charap and Har...