A standard double auction market collects bids from traders and matches them to find the most efficient allocation, assuming that the value of unsold items remains unchanged. In the market for perishable goods, sellers suffer a loss when they fail to sell their goods, because their salvage values are lost when the goods perish. To solve this problem, we investigate the design of an online doubl...

A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and a¢ liated private information. If there are su¢ ciently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a su¢ ciently …ne discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing biddin...

Mobile Auction Bidding is a developing mechanism that may widely used by GPRS enabled mobile around the world. Many dependable models existing in internet enabled platform. The proposed Auction Bidding Mobile application is basically based on Japanese auction, Double auction and English auction. Making the business model trustworthy, security is being provided by RAC (Randomized Alphanumeric Ci...

We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism which satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the ef...

Auctions have been widely studied as an efficient approach of allocating spectrum among secondary users in recent years. On the other side, a wide range of frequency bands could be available in a spectrum auction considering the current trend of deregulating wireless resources, therefore, channels provided by the primary users may reside in widely separated frequency bands, and due to the diffe...

Evolutionary algorithms based on stochastic programming are proposed for learning of the optimum bid in auction markets. Sellers and buyers are attempting to learn their optimum bids that maximize their individual utility functions in the next round of the game. Examples of a second-price sealed-bid auction, and double auction markets, with random and merit-based matching processes are consider...

In this paper, we present an agent which is able to negotiate the buying and selling of imperfectly sustitutable goods in a double auction style market. Two goods are said to be imperfectly substitutable if a buyer can use either of them, but prefers one over the other. For example, an electronics manufacturer using a RAM chip can use many suppliers to do this but may be willing to pay a premiu...

A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of the valuations define supply and demand functions. One unit of the good is auctioned. At successive, discrete time instances, a player is randomly selected ...

Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyze it using simulation, dimensional analysis, and theoretical tools based on mean field approximations. The model make...