Until the late 70's information system technology (i.e., computers, communications network, etc.) had not been flexible enough to adjust itself to vario~s managerial styles, in particular to decentralized organizations. Computers were large and centralized; consequently, data bases and computing power could not be delegated to the end user. The rapid progress in the development of microcomputer...

This paper concentrates on the question of organizational design under asymmetric information. The design of the organization has two parts: first, communication channels between the members should be established and second, the tasks should be allocated to the party that performs it in the most efficient way. We show that if the decisions are delegated to the agents, the agent’s decisions reve...

We formalise and investigate the following problem. A principal must delegate a number of decisions to a collection of agents. Once the decisions are delegated, the agents to whom the decisions are delegated will act selfishly, rationally, and independently in pursuit of their own preferences. The principal himself is assumed to be self-interested, and has some goal that he desires to be achiev...

In a stylized model of common agency with two competing principals and a privately informed agent, we study how competition in nonlinear pricing affects the measure of agents who participate. Two forms of competition are examined. When participation is restricted to all-or-nothing (what has been called “intrinsic” agency), the agent must choose between both principal’s contracts or selecting he...

Most power relationships between organizations and stakeholders are episodic circuits of power whereby resource dependence is exacerbated by prohibitive rules. Such relationships are usually constraining rather than empowering and generate resistance and reluctant compliance rather than co-operation and creativity. Clegg’s (1989) concept of facilitative circuits of power, however, suggests that...