The purpose of this paper is to suggest a new theory of portfolio selection which is based on evolutionary reasoning in simple repeated market situations. According to this new point of view the ultimate success of a portfolio strategy is measured by the wealth share the strategy is eventually able to conquer in an evolutionary process of market selection. We identify a simple portfolio strateg...

We study forward-looking economic models assuming that agents take one step ahead expectations looking back k time periods. We show that the dynamics of the economy with such an expectation function are characterized by the coexistence of perfect foresight and nonperfect foresight cycles. The stability of all these periodic solutions under bounded rationality is related to the stability of the ...

Recent studies suggest psychological differences between conservatives and liberals, including that conservatives are more overconfident. We use a behavioral political economy model to show that while this is undoubtedly true for election years in the current era, there is no reason to believe that conservative ideologies are intrinsically linked to overconfidence. Indeed, it appears that in 19...

We examine robustness of stability under learning to observability of exogenous shocks. Regardless of observability assumptions, the minimal state variable solution is robustly stable under learning provided the expectational feedback is not both positive and large, while the nonfundamental solution is never robustly stable. Overlapping generations and New Keynesian models are considered and co...

In an asset-pricing model, risk-averse agents need to forecast the conditional variance of a stock’s return. A near-rational restricted perceptions equilibrium exists in which agents believe prices follow a random walk with a conditional variance that is self-fulfilling. When agents estimate risk in realtime, recurrent bubbles and crashes can arise. These effects are stronger when agents allow ...

In this paper the authors explore the ability of simple monetary models with bounded rationality to account for the joint distribution of money and prices. They impose restrictions on the size of the mistakes agents can make in equilibrium and argue that countries with high inflation are likely to satisfy these restrictions. Their computations show that the model with bounded rationality does n...

We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the actions of the other. Our main finding is that increased interaction between the agents can lower the speed of learning: when both agents observe each other, learning is significantly slower than it is when one only observes the other. This slowdown is driven by a process in which a consensus on ...

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent’s payo¤s. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent’s actions or payo¤s. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any …nite two-person game. Keywor...

We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is the degree of risk rather than the amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. JEL Classification: C44, D29, D8...

This paper presents a model in which a firm attempts to gain market power by pricing above the competitive market price and simply trying to persuade illinformed consumers not to search for other lower priced firms. Fictitious price comparisons, or false sale signs could be used in this way to deceptively and profitably deter consumer search. A simplified model shows how this mechanism could ex...