We propose a set of basic properties that any reasonable segregation index should have. We then fully characterize the class of segregation indices that satisfy these basic properties. We show that every such index has a particular simple form. Finally, we show that with one rarely used exception, each index defined in the literature violates one or more of our basic properties. Journal of Econ...

Empirical Approaches to Inequality of Opportunity: Principles, Measures, and Evidence We put together the different conceptual issues involved in measuring inequality of opportunity, discuss how these concepts have been translated into computable measures, and point out the problems and choices researchers face when implementing these measures. Our analysis identifies and suggests several new p...

We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of indivisible items to two players with additive utilities. We design a procedure that looks for all the maximin allocations. The procedure makes repeated use of an extension of the Adjusted Winner, an effective procedure that deals with divisible items, to find new candidate solutions, and to suggest which items should be assigned to the p...

It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of deÞning social preferences over distributions of a Þxed bundle of divisible goods. The paper follows an approach to preference aggregation which relies only on interpersonally non-comparable preferences, and circumvents Arrow’s impossibility by taking account of the shape of indifference ...

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this agg...

We present a series of non-cooperative games with monotone best replies whose set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of stable matchings. Key features of stable matchings are established as familiar properties of games with monotone best replies. Then we present a sense in which our method is necessary for the monotonicity approach. We also establish the connection of our approach with o...

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure an...

Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other’s intentions while they have different outcomeinvariant properties. Agents are experimentally confir...

This paper characterizes welfarist social evaluation in a multi-profile setting where, in addition to multiple utility profiles, there may be more than one profile of nonwelfare information. We prove a new version of the welfarism theorem in this alternative framework, and we demonstrate that adding a plausible and weak anonymity property to the welfarism axioms generates welfarist social-evalu...

We present a high-statistic numerical study of the free energy of a monopole-antimonopole pair in pure SU(2) theory. We find that the monopole-antimonopole interaction potential exhibits a screened behavior, as one would expect in presence of a monopole condensate. Screening occurs both in the low-temperature, confining phase of the theory, and in the high-temperature deconfined phase, with no ...