We ask under what conditions transmission contracts increase or mitigate market power. We show that the allocation process of transmission rights is crucial. In an efficiently arbitraged uniform price auction generators will only obtain contracts that mitigate their market power. However, if generators inherit transmission contracts or buy them in a ‘pay-as-bid’ auction, then these contracts ca...

This paper shows how a competitive ancillary service market for voltage control/reactive power might operate and what it might look like, given the eminently local nature of the service. An automatic voltage control would dynamically manage the reactive power available in a certain geographic region and a local market in reactive power could then be developed similarly to that proposed for the ...

Intensified industrialization in developing countries has recently resulted in huge electric power demand growth; however, electricity generation in these countries is still heavily reliant on inefficient and traditional non-renewable technologies. In this paper, we develop an integrated game-theoretic model for effective power systems planning thorough balancing between supply and demand for e...

Small scale power generating technologies, such as gas turbines, small hydro turbines, photovoltaics, wind turbines and fuel cells, are gradually replacing conventional generating technologies, for various applications, in the electric power system. The industry restructuring process in the United States is exposing the power sector to market forces, which is creating competitive structures for...

We use agent-based simulation in a coordination game to analyse the possibility of market power abuse in a competitive electricity market. The context of this was a real application to the England and Wales electricity market as part of a Competition Commission Inquiry into whether two particular generators could profitably influence wholesale prices. The research contributions of this paper ar...

This paper examines the incentives to exercise market power that generators would face and the different strategies that they would follow if all electricity supplies in Chile were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modeled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro scheduling decision. Quantitative simulations of the strategi...

This paper examines the incentives to exercise market power that generators would face and the di®erent strategies that they would follow if all electricity supplies in Chile were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modeled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro scheduling decision. Quantitative simulations of the strategic...