This paper argues for theoretical modeling and model-construction as central (but not necessarily the only) types of activities that philosophers social ontology (in analytic tradition) engage in. claim is defended through a detailed case study revisionary interpretation Raimo Tuomela’s account we-perspective. My grounded in Ronald Giere’s scientific models, argued to be compatible with, but le...

In two studies, we predicted and found that inferences about motive and character influence intentionality attributions about foreseeable consequences of action (i.e., side effects). First, we show that inferences about intentionality are greater for good side effects than bad side effects when a target person's character is described positively. In Study 2, we manipulated information about a t...

Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life—all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step, humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that indi...

It is often assumed that consciousness and intentionality are two mutually independent aspects of mental life. When the assumption is denounced, it usually gives way to the claim that consciousness is somehow dependent upon intentionality. The possibility that intentionality may be dependent upon consciousness is rarely entertained. Recently, however, John Searle and Colin McGinn have argued fo...

Can an event's blameworthiness distort whether people see it as intentional? In controversial recent studies, people judged a behavior's negative side effect intentional even though the agent allegedly had no desire for it to occur. Such a judgment contradicts the standard assumption that desire is a necessary condition of intentionality, and it raises concerns about assessments of intentionali...

Many remember an Iron Lady claiming that there is no such thing as society but only individuals. Considerably less, we assume, are also aware that the same Lady granted existence also to families, and hence by extension to groups. If this Lady were a social philosopher, she could have continued her inquiry wondering whether families and groups, like individuals, can have intentional states. Can...

This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers...

The results from a number of recent studies suggest that ascriptions of intentionality are based on evaluative considerations: specifically, that the likelihood of viewing a person’s actions as intentional is greater when the outcome is bad than good (see Knobe, 2006, 2010). In this research we provide an alternative explanation for these findings, one based on the idea that ascriptions of inte...

The need to adapt climate change brings about moral concerns that according ‘eco-centric’ critiques cannot be resolved by modernist ethics, as this takes humans the only beings capable of intentionality and rationality. However, if rationality are reconsidered ‘counterfactual hypotheses’ it becomes possible align ethics with eco-centric approaches. These counterfactual hypotheses guide developm...