This paper studies discounted stochastic games with perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers. We show that for all discount factors every public perfect equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a simple class of equilibria that have a stationary structure on the equilibrium path and optimal penal codes with a stick and carrot structure...

This paper covers “soft measures” that can be used in a “stick and carrot” strategy to improve accessibility to web sites. Two examples of benchmarking are presented. The first is the benchmarking of 700 Norwegian public web sites that has been carried out three times the last years, giving experiences on how to carry out the analyses and how to use the results for awareness raising and stimula...

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty rational policy choice. should give when they are winning: risk misinterpreted signals lessened, costs low, weakened, so used instrumentally encourage defection or divisi...

Abstract Vehicle registrations have been shown to strongly react tax reforms aimed at reducing CO 2 emissions from passengers’ cars, but are the effects equally strong for positive and negative changes? The literature on asymmetric reactions price changes has documented asymmetries everyday goods not yet considered durables. We leverage multiple vehicle registration (VRT) in Norway estimate th...

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the principal can make an investment and the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that effort is higher after a success than after a failure...

In this paper, we study infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an efficient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishmen...