Now-a-days repair and rehabilitation of the existing structures in developing countries has become solitary most thought-provoking tasks Civil Engineering sector. Imperfections, fiasco general distress can be outcome fundamental deficiency produced by inaccurate design, poor workmanship or overloading construction. It also instigated corrosion, fire natural calamities. A spoiled distrait struct...

We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechlárová (2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a po...

We examine a search money model in which there is a symmetric coincidence of wants in all barter matches. However, when bargaining outcomes are asymmetric across matches, the barter economy is inefficient. Then a robust monetary equilibrium exists provided that money holders enjoy adequate bargaining terms. Fiat money may be welfare improving. In contrast to the literature, it is the asymmetry ...

We show the incompatibility between the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in Shaked’s game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown and the behavior of players consistent with the Allais Paradox. Thus, the strategic support of the equally marginally bold solution presented in Burgos, Grant, and Kajii [2002. Games Econ. Behav. 38, 28–51] does not go beyond the two-person case....

I study a bilateral bargaining game in which the size of the surplus follows a stochastic process and in which players might be optimistic about their bargaining power. Following Yildiz (2003), I model optimism by assuming that players have different beliefs about the recognition process. I show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game might involve inefficient delays. I also sh...

In this paper, we study out-of-equilibrium dynamics with decentralized exchange (bilateral bargaining between randomly matched pairs of agents). We characterise the conditions under which out-of-equilibrium trading convergences to efficient allocations even when agents are myopic and have limited information and show, numerically, that the rate of convergence to efficient allocations is exponen...

In this paper, we study out-of-equilibrium dynamics with decentralized exchange (bilateral bargaining between randomly matched pairs of agents). We characterise the conditions under which out-of-equilibrium trading convergences to efficient allocations even when agents are myopic and have limited information. We show, numerically, that the rate of convergence to efficient allocations is exponen...

Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other’s intentions while they have different outcomeinvariant properties. Agents are experimentally confir...

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequ...

Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles in insurance economics. We extend the original analysis by considering firms which face capacity constraints, which might be due to limited capital. We show that under mild assumptions a pure strategy equil...