We consider a continuous time system influenced by different agents who adopt moving horizon control. The well known Nash equilibrium concept is used to define two solution concepts fitting in the moving horizon structure. One of them is analyzed in more detail in the class of linear quadratic games. The (dis)advantages of moving horizon control are illustrated by means of a government debt sta...

This paper develops a real options model of imperfect competition with asymmetric information that analyzes firms’ exit decisions. Optimal exit decision is linked to firm characteristics such as financial leverage and efficiency. The model shows that informational asymmetries between product market rivals can lead more efficient and less leveraged firms to leave the product market prematurely. ...

This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe payoffs and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. Public randomization is available. We find that, very generally, the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state in the limit as the discount factor goes to one. We also provide a recursive charac...

We investigate the issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity in differential games. We prove that instantaneous best replies exist if Hamiltonian functions are multiplicative in the control variables. Otherwise, if the Hamiltonians are addively separable w.r.t. controls, a dominant strategy emerges for each player. In this case, however, imposing stationarity on the differential equat...

We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated game with bounded-memory pure strategies. Our result requires each player’s payoff to be strictly above the pure minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor public randomization, nor communication. The type of strategies we employ to establish our result turn out to have new features that may be important...

We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the actions of the other. Our main finding is that increased interaction between the agents can lower the speed of learning: when both agents observe each other, learning is significantly slower than it is when one only observes the other. This slowdown is driven by a process in which a consensus on ...

The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies’ current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, and it converges globally to N...

We revisit Fujiwara’s (2008) di¤erential duopoly game to show that the degenerate nonlinear feedback identi…ed by the tangency point with the stationary state line is indeed unstable, given the dynamics of the natural resource exploited by …rms. To do so, we fully characterise the continuum of nonlinear feedback solution via Rowat’s (2007) method, characterising the in…nitely many stable nonlin...

We define a new notion of dominance, sequential z-dominance, and show that for any TU game with a nonempty core, every process of successive blocks must terminate in the core if the notion of sequential z-dominance is employed. Moreover, this result leads to an upper bound for the number of blocks needed to reach the core, which is lower than the one given in Kóczy (2006). JEL classification nu...