We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately imp...

Many public goods that are provided by coalitions have a group-size e¤ect. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a larger coalition. This paper studies local public goods games with anonymous and separable group-size e¤ect. The core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and players’preferences over public goods satisfy a condition called cardinal connectedness. More...

We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-co...

This paper provides a non-symmetric generalization of the position value for communication situations. The definition of the weighted position value is motivated by the two different kinds of asymmetry in communication situations. It is shown that the weighted position value is characterized by component efficiency and a modification of balanced link contributions that is used by Slikker (Inter...

This note shows that there are monetary equilibria in the model of overlapping generations that are in the core. Some equilibria have positive stocks of outside money in every generation. These equilibria are thus self-enforcing, and introducing money into an economy need not be tantamount to contriving a new social institution designed to enforce sequential contracts. Journal of Economic Liter...

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certa...

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our mor...

We suggest new characterizations of the Banzhaf value without the symmetry axiom, which reveal that the characterizations by Lehrer (1988, International Journal of Game Theory 17, 89–99) and Nowak (1997, International Journal of Game Theory 26, 127–141) as well as most of the characterizations by Casajus (2010, Theory and Decision, forthcoming) are redundant. Further, we explore symmetry implic...

We define a new notion of dominance, sequential z-dominance, and show that for any TU game with a nonempty core, every process of successive blocks must terminate in the core if the notion of sequential z-dominance is employed. Moreover, this result leads to an upper bound for the number of blocks needed to reach the core, which is lower than the one given in Kóczy (2006). JEL classification nu...

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium de…nitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of de…nitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are po...