This paper examines why rms buy back at prices below the average market price. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that contrarian trading is the major driver of the di erence between average monthly repurchase price and average monthly market price. There is also evidence in favor of the notion that at least some rms are able to time the market by exploiting private information. More...

ANY SHELTERED WORKSHOPS do not provide actual work. Sheltered workshops often exist to provide a place for handicapped individuals to spend their day engaging in arts and crafts activities that are unsalable. Many sheltered workshops have greenhouses that grow and sell plants and herbs for little more than it costs to buy seed. Most workshops do business on a contract by contract basis where a ...

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This paper proposes a production-inventory model with setup cost for production and financial compensation for stopping production when the buy-back program is activated, which is a modified model to that of [Chen et al 2007] by including the setup cost. Under an energy buyback program, we consider M+1 types of market scenarios and the corresponding buy-back levels with different financial comp...

We study the interaction of long-term contracting and spot market transactions between Multi-Gencos and MultiDiscos for electric power. Gencos and Discos may either contract for delivery in advance or they may sell/buy some or all of their output/input in a spot market. Contract pricing involves both a reservation fee per unit of capacity and an execution fee per unit of output if capacity is c...

With siRNA-based drugs becoming established as a therapeutic modality, large companies are engaging in the field through deals and acquisitions, cardiovascular metabolic diseases among their targets.

Purpose: Our paper is to analyze optimal purchasing strategies when a manufacturer can buy raw materials from a long-term contract supplier and a spot market under spot price uncertainty. Design/methodology/approach: The procurement model is solved by using dynamic programming. First, we maximize the DM’s utility of the second period, obtaining the optimal contract quantity and spot quantity fo...

The standard solution to adverse selection is the separating equilibrium introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz. Usually, the Rothschild-Stiglitz argument is developed in a model that allows for two states of the world only. In this paper adverse selection is discussed for continuous loss distributions. This gives rise to the new problem of finding the proper form of an insurance contract to imp...