This paper considers the possibility of collective action by the business community to counter corruption in the award of government licenses and contracts. The analogy is with contract enforcement institutions studied by economic historians and contract law scholars. The institution in this context comprises a no-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations, and a multilateral ostraci...

This study examines how the notions of moral and pragmatic legitimacy explain role Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) corporate governance guidelines on anti-bribery disclosure practices by companies. In particular, focusing largest 100 ASX-listed companies between 2001 2011, we aim to explore competing how, during moments crisis, managers, via disclosures, create a deficit in pursuing legitimacy....

How do noise and bribery affect the accuracy of collective decision rules? This paper presents simulation results that measure the accuracy of ten well known collective decision rules under noise and bribery. When noise is low these rules can be divided into accurate ("good") and inaccurate ("bad") groups. The bad rules' accuracy improves, sometimes significantly, when noise increases while the...

Bribery has become the kind of corruption with highest annual incidence rate. Therefore, hunt for solutions to these problems must continue. Consequently, this research be conducted. The objective is examine how big data and whistle-blowing system affect prevention bribery. This investigation was conducted utilizing a quantitative methodology. 191 auditors from Financial Development Supervisory...

The largest democratic party in Indonesia will win simultaneous elections 2024. Indonesian people have a right to elect leader who is willing serve them and does not engage corruption. To produce dignified general election, this election must be performed accordance with the law. goal of study examine outline initiatives avoid voter bribery ensure fair elections. normative research method was e...

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...

In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in context a game involving manager and controller. We propose model where controller initiates bribe demand from manager. identify structure three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, show their uniqueness. Next, analyze influence parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus reputation gain) manager's controller's bonuses / penalties on e...