Title of dissertation: ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL MICROECONOMICS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Quynh T. Nguyen, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 Dissertation directed by: Professor Mark Duggan Assistant Professor Jeanne Lafortune Department of Economics My dissertation consists of two independent empirical microeconomics studies in development economics. Though studying di¤erent interventions, they share the same...

This contribution discusses the bene ts of a cell level forward error correction FEC scheme in the AAL An FEC scheme will bene t real time needs of multimedia applications as well as reliable data communications An ATM network performance degrades rapidly with increasing cell loss or the bit error rate BER of the medium The achievable throughput for reliable services also deteriorates with incr...

In this paper we describe an experiment in which we cast Generic Tasks into the mold provided by KEW. The result was advantageous for both GT theory and KEW GT bene tted by being formalized, and by gaining a computer implementation. KEW bene tted by having its strategy vindicated on a new target theory, and having its software more thoroughly tested. The experiment also exposed a weakness in th...

We introduce a special family of (assumption-based argumentation) frameworks for reasoning about the bene ts of decisions. These frameworks can be used for representing the knowledge of intelligent agents that can autonomously choose the \best" decisions, given subjective needs and preferences of decision-makers they \represent". We understand \best" decisions as dominant ones, giving more bene...

This paper reports the ndings of a systematic review on the literature concerning the potential contribution of Enterprise Architecture (EA) to the achievement of various business goals. The review revealed the current state of the scienti c and practitioner's literature concerning the potential bene ts of EA as describing 29 unique contexts within which EA has been found to deliver 100 unique ...

When designing incentives for heterogeneous agents facing competition there is a con‡icting interaction: as the more able are incentivized the less able are disincentivized. I label the former the "incentive e¤ect" and the latter the "discouragement e¤ect." Such adverse interaction becomes severe in the face of participants having convex costs of e¤ort or capacity constraints, larger contests, ...