We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with n identical buyers and a seller who initially commits to some capacity. Sales are sequential and each price is determined by strategic bargaining. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists. It is characterized by absence of costly bargaining delays and each trade is settled at a different price. Prices increase with n and fall in t...

This paper shows how job design in‡uences investments and bargaining power during production and examines its implications for the distribution of earnings between management and workers. Without bargaining, the decision to assign each worker to narrowly or broadly de…ned jobs depends on which mode elicits more investments from workers. However, job design makes workers’ investments either subs...

In recent years analysts have examined the effects of bargaining power over household economic decisions on individual well-being. Much of this work has focused on the determinants and consequences of women’s bargaining power. We build on this line of research by classifying households into three types of power structure based on whether the mother, the father, or both jointly decide on food pu...

Gender inequality is linked to women’s unequal bargaining power in the household. Greater equity can be achieved by expanding women’s outside options. Paid work is a likely mechanism for improving women’s household bargaining power. But the dual phenomenon of women’s segregation in export industries in developing countries and increased firm mobility result in their unequal bargaining power vis...

In this paper, we employ a uni…ed approach to Nash’s two-person bargaining problem by using a class of axioms, which we term Common Disagreement Point (CDP) axioms. These axioms describe under what circumstances parties that expect to face sometimes uncertain nested or non-nested bargaining sets can reach interim outcomes. By doing so, these axioms portray a bargaining process, and thereby brid...

We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. A friction parameter is τ , the length of the time period until the next meeting. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in τ , which is shown to be the faste...

We study a model of individual wage bargaining between heterogeneous workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, free firm entry, workers’ individual productivities are discovered by firms only after being hired, and it is expensive for firms to hire and fire workers. We show that inefficiencies due to bargaining and externalities in the matching process lead firms to employ too few worker ...