We compare Gamson’s Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two non-cooperative bargaining models in three player divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does Gamson’s Law. We al...

I telling the tale of, and analyzing the decisions made by, an heir claimant to a large fortune, Lippman and McCardle (2004) introduce embedded Nash bargaining, an approach to modeling joint decision making. They embed several bargaining games in a joint decision tree and calculate the expected payoffs to the two sides if the Nash bargaining solution is used to generate the intermediate payoffs...

In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of DavisMaschler and Zhou coincide in a class of shortest path games

In experimental tests of human behavior in unstructured bargaining games, typically many joint utility outcomes are found to occur, not just one. This suggests we predict the outcome of such a game as a probability distribution. This is in contrast to what is conventionally done (e.g, in the Nash bargaining solution), which is predict a single outcome. We show how to translate Nash’s bargaining...

The reduced game relevant for the consistency of the prekernel is used to reinterpret this solution concept in a way that makes it independent of interpersonal utility comparisons. Based on this reinterpretation, a non-cooperative model is presented that yields in stationary equilibria the prekernel (kernel) for the class of monotonic transferable utility games. Next, we apply the same non-coop...

This paper studies generic properties of Markov Perfect equilibrium of coalitional bargaining games. We show that in almost all games (except in a set of measure zero of the parameter space) the equilibrium is locally unique and stable, and comparative statics analysis are welldefined and can be performed using standard calculus tools. Global uniqueness does not hold in general, but the number ...

We introduce a weighted version of the component e¢ cient -value Casajus (2008, Games Econ Behav, forthcoming) for TU games with a coalition structure. This value can be viewed as the outcome of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to the players’problem of distributing their components’worth where the Shapley payo¤s serve as threat point. We provide characterizations both for exogenous and ...