International trustee courts embody a specific form of delegation, in which state principals confer on such the authority to interpret and apply treaties agreed by states order realize values interests. Human rights help resolve commitment enforcement problems that are inherent human treaties. This study seeks answer question, what happens when parties seek reduce or eliminate court? To these q...

We explore a possible solution to the free-rider problem involving the delegation of individual contribution decisions to an elected agent. Our first experiment demonstrates that when delegation is an exogenously imposed institution, it results in the efficient full contribution outcome, primarily because groups elect pro-social agents to make the allocation decisions and replace those who do n...

-Mambo, et al. [3] discussed the delegation of signature power to a proxy signer. Lee, et al. [5] constructed a strong non-designated proxy signature scheme in which the proxy signer had strong nonrepudiation. In this paper, we present an enhancement to their scheme such that the identity of the proxy signer is hidden behind an alias. The identity can be revealed only by the alias authority. We...

We present a distributed framework where agents can share data along with usage policies. We use an expressive policy language including conditions, obligations and delegation. Our framework also supports the possibility to refine policies. Policies are not enforced a-priori. Instead policy compliance is checked using an a-posteriri auditing approach. Policy compliance is shown by a (logical) p...

FRAMEWORK FOR ROLE-BASED DELEGATION MODELS Ezedin S. Barka, Ph.D. George Mason University, 2002 Dissertation Director: Dr. Ravi S. Sandhu The basic idea behind delegation is that some active entity in a system delegates authority to another active entity in order to carry out some functions on behalf of the former. Delegation can take many forms: human to human, human to machine, machine to mac...

A large literature, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that delegation of authority and incentives should have a positive relationship. Using data from a large cross section of British establishments, we show that the positive relationship between incentives and delegation that has been consistently documented in the empirical literature masks a stark difference between job types. We clas...

We generalize standard delegation models to consider policymaking when both information and authority are dispersed among multiple actors. In our theory, the principal may delegate partial authority to a privately-informed agent while also reserving some authority for the principal’s use after observing the agent’s decision. Counterintuitively, the equilibrium amount of authority delegated to t...