This dissertation aims to evaluate corporate social responsibility (CSR) impacts on the UK listed retailers' agency costs in 2016-2020 and is broken down into three main objectives – (1) describe CSR performance level, (2) test of these firms, (3) moderating role industry for CSR-agency relationship. By application regressions with fixed effects robust standard error type, this study has reveal...

This research reviews and tests two contradicting notions in cost stickiness literature by empirical recognition of the consequences of cost stickiness. Cost stickiness is consistent with both rational resource planning and opportunistic incentives of manager to increase personal benefits arising from status and power. Although both mechanisms involve asymmetric retention of slack, some of the ...

S | 48 An Agency Theory of Patent Law: Linking Innovators and Invention Users Richard Gruner Professor, John Marshall Law School Chicago, IL This article presents a reinterpretation of patent laws as components of agency relationships linking innovators and innovation users. In these relationships, patent rights substitute for privately negotiated contract terms tying the interests of persons w...

Production coordination is a common phenomenon in supply chains. Unlike the existing literature, we examine the production coordination problem from the perspective of asymmetric information: how a manufacturer (leading firm) coordinates the relationships with its subsidiary firm(s) and, subsequently, how market returns influence the leading firm's expected utilities, agency cost and the subsid...

Scholars have proposed agency, game, resource-dependency, and transaction cost theories as a means to study outsourcing. Although risks faced by outsourcing firms and developers (i.e., vendors) and corresponding agency costs have been identified, key agency constructs (e.g., firm competence, risk-neutrality of the developer) and their linkage to outsourcing practice (e.g., monitoring, screening...

Managerial opportunism is commonly considered as destructive for the parties involved in an agency relationship. Using a formulation close to Jensen and Meckling’s equity model, we consider an agency relationship between a manager and an investor. The latter is assumed to benefit from a market power in terms of external funding opportunities. For high values of the prevailing rate of interest, ...