We present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market segmentation (depending on the level of ethnic fractionalization). The model predicts a specific form ...

There is long-standing theoretical debate on the role of collateral in …nancial markets. There is no satisfactory evidence of the causal relationship (if any) between the amount of collateral required and the subsequent probability of overdues. We analyze an exogenous change in the number of cosigners required as collateral on small loans in South India. Our regression discontinuity approach re...

Competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality. Following Arrow and Debreu (1954) [6], I formulate a standard growth model with externality—a twoperiod version of Romer (1986) [39]—as a game among consumers, firms, and intermediaries. The Walrasian equilibrium, with an auctioneer, does not achieve the social optimum. Without an auctioneer or int...

Micro…nance is typically associated with joint liability of group members. However, a large part of micro…nance institutions rather o¤ers individual instead of group loans. We analyze the incentive mechanisms in both individual and group contracts. Moreover, we show that micro…nance institutions o¤er group loans when the loan size is rather large, re…nancing costs are high, and competition betw...

In nascent markets with relatively immature institutions, do depositors have the capacity to discipline banks with poor fundamentals? If so, what information specifically guides their response? Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we present evidence for quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, particularly after the 1998 financial ...

When expanding abroad, a multinational bank faces a trade-o¤ between accessing a foreign country via cross border lending or a …nancial foreign direct investment, i.e. green…eld or acquisition entry. We analyze the entry mode choice of multinational banks and explicitly derive the entry mode pattern in the banking industry. Moreover, we show that in less developed banking markets, a trend towar...

We estimate the effect of social capital on the ability of households to insure consumption after unexpected negative shocks. Many theoretical models argue that strong ties to extended family members and to one’s community help protect families when an adult becomes ill or disabled. Using household-level longitudinal data on Indonesian families, we test whether consumption declines less after a...

The paper considers maximum likelihood estimation of dynamic panel structural equation models with latent variables and fixed effects (DPSEM). This generalises the structural equation methods where latent variables are measured by multiple observable indicators and where structural and measurement models are jointly estimated to dynamic panel models with fixed effects. Analytical expressions fo...

There is long-standing theoretical debate on the role of collateral in …nancial markets. There is no satisfactory evidence of the causal relationship (if any) between the amount of collateral required and the subsequent probability of overdues. We analyze an exogenous change in the number of cosigners required as collateral on small loans in South India. Our regression discontinuity approach re...