If there were no impediments to the ‡ow of capital across space, then the returns to capital should be equalized. We provide evidence to the contrary. There are large di¤erences in the return to comparable investments across di¤erent towns in the state of Tamil Nadu in South India. We explore why these di¤erences are not arbitraged away –and suggest that if an insider has monopoly power in arbi...

With regard to the market structure and performance in Bangladesh banking industry, there are two competing hypotheses—the traditional structure–conduct–performance (SCP) hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis (EH). Using pooled and annual data for the period 1999–2002, this study tests the validity of these two hypotheses. In general, the results of this study support the EH hypothesis as an...

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independent determination of each agent’s type (impatient or patient), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. For general preferences, we show, via a simple argume...

We study an oligopoly model of banking that allows us to evaluate the two leading explanations for banks’ ability to earn rents. In the model, banks can either invest in information acquisition, or in market power (through product differentiation). The two versions generate different predictions that are tested using panel data on Finnish local banks. We find that banks’ investments in branch n...

Private banks often blame state guarantees to distort competition by giving public banks the advantage of lower funding costs. In this paper I show that if borrowers perceive the public bank as supporting economic development, private banks may be able to separate firms by self selection, enter the market, and obtain profits in equilibrium despite their cost disadvantage. The public bank’s comp...

This paper investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance. We construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral, borrow from banks, and invest in long-term projects. We assume that collateral value has aggregate risk over time, that in any period entrepreneurs can abscond with the projects but losing the collateral,...

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the...