We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e40: This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. r 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. J...

This paper uses the Clarke mechanism to construct an incentive compatible tâtonnement process which converges to the Lindahl allocation of a public good economy. We show truth telling is an equilibrium in the infinite horizon game induced by the tâtonnement. JEL Codes: C72, D44, H41

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum deterministic stopping game with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite subgraph which is monochromatic.  2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. JEL classification: ...

We compare the behavior of car mechanics and college students as sellers in experimental credence goods markets. Finding largely similar behavior, we note much more overtreatment by car mechanics, probably due to decision heuristics they learned in their professional training. JEL classifications: C91, D82, C72

The theory of melioration, originally formulated for individual decision-making contexts, is formally extended to a game theoretic framework. This paper proves the existence of a distribution that is a melioration strategy on the part of all players. Further, the question of stability of such a distribution is studied. JEL Classification Numbers: C62; C72.

Under complete information, for k 3, a seller of a single-unit k-price auction obtains higher revenue than in a first or second price auction when the valuations and the bids are discrete and no bidder is using a (weakly) dominated strategy.  2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D44

This chapter surveys formal models of endogenous alliance formation in political science and economics. Using a unified model of conflict, we obtain general results on the effect of group sizes on conflict and on the size of stable alliances. We also discuss recent work on endogenous sharing rules and dynamic alliance formation in nested conflicts. JEL Classification Numbers: D74, D72, C72

Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency. JEL Classification: C72, D82

Public communication is secure if a hostile third party cannot detect the informational content of the messages exchanged by the communicating parties. In Nash equilibrium, communication by computationally unbounded players cannot be secure. We assume complexity averse players, and show that a simple, secure and costless communication protocol becomes available as the marginal complexity cost t...