Many care robots have received a lot of attention to help elderly people, however existing care robots have difficult to adapt personalization. For instance, some programmers have to customize robot program to meet needs of individual. In this paper, the authors’ goal is design and develop care robot which provides personalization for an individual elderly people with an efficient and reasonabl...

The mid-to-late part of the frontal plane QRS loop (Frank lead system) of 150 consecutive subjects with an old inferior myocardial infarction was analyzed. During the acute episode all cases had to satisfy Myers' classical ECG criteria for the diagnosis. The vectorcardiogram was recorded months to years later. As a result of this analysis and in order to prevent overlap with values found in 450...

Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of the auction (or alternativel...

This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with single-minded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation VCG, that is individually rational, incentive compatible and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG ...

Mechanism design provides a framework to solve distributed optimization problems in systems of self-interested agents. The combinatorial auction is one such problem, in which there is a set of discrete items to allocate to agents. Unfortunately, recent results suggest that it is impossible to implement reasonable approximations without losing robustness to manipulation. Furthermore, the Vickrey...

Redistribution of VCG payments has been mostly studied in the context of resource allocation. This paper focuses on another fundamental model—the public project problem. In this scenario, the VCG mechanism collects in payments up to n−1 n of the total value of the agents. This collected revenue represents a loss of social welfare. Given this, we study how to redistribute most of the VCG revenue...

The Vector cardiography is the 3 dimensional study of Electrocardiographic responses of the human heart. A Vector cardiograph (VCG) instrument was designed and developed to monitor the Cardiographic responses of the Indian payload specialist under zero G conditions in the US Space Shuttle during the scheduled INSAT-lC launch. Accordingly the proposal made by Department of Space for using the ve...

When information or control in a multiagent system is private to the agents, they may misreport this information or refuse to execute an agreed outcome, in order to change the resulting end state of such a system to their benefit. In some domains this may result in an execution failure. We show that in such settings VCG mechanisms lose truthfulness, and that the utility of truthful agents can b...

At the very beginning of the semester, we saw an incredibly powerful tool in mechanism design: the VCG mechanism. You remember: the VCG mechanism lets us find the welfare-optimal solution for any social choice problem, and pair it with payments that makes truthful reporting of one’s preferences a dominant strategy for every player. Pretty impressive! Yet, one-shot direct revelation mechanisms a...

Micali and Valiant proposed a mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is dominant-strategy truthful, guarantees reasonably high revenue, and is very resilient against collusions. Their mechanism, however, uses as a subroutine the VCG mechanism, that is not polynomial time. We propose a modification of their mechanism that is efficient, while retaining their collusion resilience and a good fra...