A two-count ry, twōrm model has been developed to study equilibrium lobbying posit ions in intra-industry trade under cost uncertainty. A ̄rm chooses either a protect ionist posit ion or a free-t rader posit ion. The model predicts that taking the free-t rader (protect ionist) lobbying posit ion is an e± cient (ine± cient) ̄rm's dominant strategy. In addit ion, for any lobbying posit ion taken ...

Among non-oil exports and in trade arena, drug has always been strategic importance and most government especially industrialized countries pay special attention to its production and trade issues. Thus, having a comprehensive view from economic perspective to this section is essential for suggesting intervention. This was a descriptive-analytical and panel study. In this study, gravity model i...

This paper studies externalities of nationally determined cost-sharing systems, in particular coinsurance rates (patients pay a percentage of the price), under pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the manufacturer’s authorized distribution channel, in a two-country model with a vertical distributor relationship. Parallel trade generates a price-decreasing competition e¤ect in the d...

The most important point in the design of broadcast encryption schemes (BESs) is obtain a good trade-o between the amount of secret information that must be stored by every user and the length of the broadcast message, which are measured, respectively, by the information rate and the broadcast information rate B. In this paper we present a simple method to combine two given BESs in order to imp...

The growth of regional trade blocks has been one of the major developments in international relations in recent years. Regional agreements vary widely but, all have the objective of reducing barriers to trade between member countries that in most cases result in increasingly trade flows and economic growth. This paper attempts to explore the results of trade integration in ECO, EU and OIC block...

We study the leverage of firms making large dividend increases. Over the five years following the dividend increase they raise leverage enough to finance the entire dividend increase for that period with debt. This is not explained by trade-off variables or the pecking order. The effect is greatest for big firms with low-powered incentives, suggesting an agency effect whereby they make large di...