We study the ordinal content of assuming supermodularity, including conditions under which a binary relation can be represented by a supermodular function. When applied to revealed-preference relations, our results imply that supermodularity is some times not refutable: A consumer’s choices can be rationalized with a supermodular utility function if they can be rationalized with a monotonic uti...

This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone potential maximizer, then the corresponding stationary state is uniquely linearly absorbing and globall...

A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent’s investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and superor submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to investment costs for supermodular as well as submodular networking games. We also study supermodular games wi...

Fictitious play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since Robinson’s (1951) classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for some important classes of games, most notably 2×2 games (Miyazawa, 1961), weighted potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996), and supermodular games with diminishing returns (Krish...

Consider a situation where a group of agents wishes to share the costs of their joint actions, and needs to determine how to distribute the costs amongst themselves in a fair manner. For example, a set of agents may agree to process their jobs together on a machine, and share the optimal cost of scheduling these jobs. This kind of situation can be modelled naturally as a cooperative game. In th...

Article history: Received 24 February 2012 Available online 14 October 2013 JEL classification: C72