We study in depth the class of games with opacity condition, which are two-player games with imperfect information in which one of the players only has imperfect information, and where the winning condition relies on the information he has along the play. Those games are relevant for security aspects of computing systems: a play is opaque whenever the player who has imperfect information never ...

In finite games subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those that are obtained by a backwards induction procedure. In large extensive form games with perfect information this equivalence does not hold: Strategy combinations fulfilling the backwards induction criterion may not be subgame perfect in general. The full equivalence is restored only under additional (topological) assumptions. This ...

The standard solution concept for perfect-information extensive form games is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, humans do not always play according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, especially in games where it is possible for all the players to obtain much higher payoffs if they place some trust in each other (and this trust is not violated). In this paper, we introduce a new sol...

For n-person perfect inlbrmation stochastic games and for n-person stochastic games with Additive Rcwards and Additive Transitions (ARAT) we show the existence of pure limiting average equilibria. Using a similar approach we also derive the existence of limiting average e-equilibria for two-person switching control stochastic games. The orderfield property holds for each of the classes mentione...

We consider n–player perfect information games with payoff functions having a finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and assumptions like continuity or measurability of payoff functions. We show that there exists a best response cycle of length four, that is, a sequence (σ...

Blackwell games are infinite games of imperfect information. The two players simultaneously make their moves and are then informed of each other’s moves. Payoff is determined by a Borel measurable function f on the set of possible resulting sequences of moves. A standard result in Game Theory is that finite games of this type are determined. Blackwell proved that infinite games are determined, ...

Blackwell games are infinite games of imperfect information. The two players simultaneously make their moves and are then informed of each other’s moves. Payoff is determined by a Borel measurable function f on the set of possible resulting sequences of moves. A standard result in Game Theory is that finite games of this type are determined. Blackwell proved that infinite games are determined, ...

Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of perfect information. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several subclasses of meanpayoff games where the players have asymmetric information about the state of the game. These games are in general undecidable and not determined according to the classic...

We present a polynomial-time reduction from parity games with imperfect information to safety games with imperfect information. Similar reductions for games with perfect information typically increase the game size exponentially. Our construction avoids such a blow-up by using imperfect information to realise succinct counters which cover a range exponentially larger than their size. In particu...