نتایج جستجو برای: spectrum auction
تعداد نتایج: 230774 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We consider what happens if sellers can make a take it or leave it offer to one of their linked buyers be...
There is nowadays unanimous agreement that spectrum should be allocated in a dynamic fashion so as to match the stochastic supply and demand by responding to spatiotemporal variations of spectrum availability and request. The imminent liberalization of the spectrum markets is expected to provide more control mechanisms for spectrum exploitation in that respect. Wireless network entities will be...
Existing wireless telephony and messaging applications have the potential of being enhanced by broadband applications supported through ‘‘third generation’’ wireless services. Across the globe, governments have been allocating electro-magnetic spectrum for these 3-G services through an auction process. The rationale being that the entity that pays the most for a resource will create the greates...
In this paper, we consider the revenue maximization problem in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We assume a frequency division method of spectrum sharing with a primary spectrum owner that can divide the available spectrum into sub-bands and sell them to secondary users. We assume that a secondary user’s utility function is linear in the rate it can achieve by using the spectrum. We presen...
Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...
In this paper, we consider the revenue maximization problem in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We assume a frequency division method of spectrum sharing with a primary spectrum owner that can divide the available spectrum into sub-bands and sell them to secondary users. We assume that a secondary user’s utility function is linear in the rate it can achieve by using the spectrum. We presen...
We propose a bidder aid tool that will allow bidders to more effectively participate in combinatorial FCC spectrum auctions by enabling concise expression of preferences. In addition to logical relationships between items, bidders may express spectrum-specific preferences such as those related to minimum population coverage, bandwidth, and budget. The tool can be used to simultaneously generate...
The award of the digital dividend can consolidate auctions as the preferred mechanism for spectrum allocation. Knowing in advance an estimate of what the results of an auction with these characteristics could be would be unquestionably useful for those in charge of designing the process, even if at the end another method such as a beauty contest is chosen. This article provides a simulation of ...
We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource via a sequential second-price auction. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy...
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