Semidefinite Ranking on Graphs Shankar Vembu, Thomas Gärtner, and Stefan Wrobel 1 Fraunhofer IAIS, Schloß Birlinghoven, 53754 Sankt Augustin, Germany 2 Department of Computer Science III, University of Bonn, Germany {shankar.vembu, thomas.gaertner, stefan.wrobel}@iais.fraunhofer.de We consider the problem of ranking the vertices of an undirected graph given some preference relation. Without inc...

The main issue raised in this note is the nonequivalence between the infinitehorizon model where agents are infinitely lived and the successive generations model with altruistic finitely lived agents: in the presence of a nonnegative bequest requirement, endowment heterogeneity imposes a revision of the acritical adoption of the infinitely lived agent representation in modern macro-economics. B...

Human mating is a complex phenomenon. Although men and women have different preferences in mate selection, there should be compatibility in these preferences since human mating requires agreement of both parties. We investigate how compatible the mating preferences of men and women are in a given property such as age, height, education and income. We use dataset of a large online dating site (N...

We consider a political economy with two partisan parties; each party represents a given constituency of voters. If one party (Labour) represents poor voters and the other (Christian Democrats) rich voters, if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue, and if there are no incentive considerations, then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity. If, howe...

While scholars have thoroughly explored the logic of two candidate electoral competition, much less has been accomplished in gaining an understanding of the role of party primaries. This paper presents an incomplete information model of primary and general elections and argues that party primaries do more than select party candidates. Party primaries serve an informational function. In an envir...

We study concurrent games with finite-memory strategies where players are given a Büchi and a mean-payoff objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its Büchi objective, and then prefers to minimise costs, which are given by a mean-payoff function. In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decid...

This paper investigates how interest rates on liquid assets and excess returns on risky assets are determined when only safe assets can be used as liquid assets when waiting for an informative signal of future payoffs. In particular, we carefully differentiate between a demand for liquid assets while waiting for new information and a demand for safe assets for precautionary reasons. Employing K...

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders wi...