This paper analyzes the behavior of single-unit all-pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory. We study revenue, individual bidding behavior, and efficiency, in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner-pay first-price sealed-bid auctions. We conclude that the all-pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the riskn...

We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance • in a very adversarial collusion model; • for any profile of strategies surviving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies; and • by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each...

• Community Revenue Collection Systems • Why Computerize? • Potential Market • Problems of Manual or Centralized Systems • Fault Tolerant Technology • Cost-Effective Mobile Technology • Scalability • Benefits for Government • Increased Collection Efficiency • Control of the Collection Process • Efficient Time Utilization • Minimal Training Required • Future Revenue Streams? • The P...

We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance • in a very adversarial collusion model; • for any profile of strategies surviving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies; and • by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each...

Background: After revenue-sharing system reform, the proportion of tax refund in fiscal transfer payments continued to decline, and the proportion of categorical grant and condition grant is increased. The paper studies how transfer payment structure effect fiscal efficiency from the perspective of local financial revenue structure. Methods: This paper use the SE-DEA model to measures the finan...

Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) are promising to increase social welfare by enabling bidders to express their valuation on any combination of items. A major issue of many CAs is the requirement to optimally solve the NP-hard Combinatorial Allocation Problem. To release a centralized auctioneer from that computational burden he can shift it to the bidders. One of the few discussed decentralized auc...

I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder’s type. Parameters permit the existence of multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions that differ in allocation, efficiency and revenue. The sequence of sale affects the competition...