s: This paper examines the optimal trade negotiation strategies in the trade negotiation involving multi-parties such as Doha Development Agenda, which is characterized by asymmetric multiple negotiators with multi-trade issues. Due to the consensus rule, which is the formal decision making rule of WTO, bilateral bargaining formula is often taken simultaneously with the multilateral bargaining ...

This paper explores how bilateral and multilateral clustering are embedded in a multilevel system of interdependent networks. We argue that, in a complex system such as global fisheries governance, in which bilateral and multilateral relations are themselves interrelated, embeddedness cannot be reduced to unipartite or bipartite clustering but implicates potential multilevel closure. We elabora...

Recent research has underlined the efficiency of the GATT/WTO rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments, emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefficient. Global free trade, in particular, is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, provid...

In this paper we propose an automated negotiation system that can efficiently carry out multilateral negotiations with multi-attributes in pervasive computing environments. For the multilateral negotiation system proposed in our study, an e-commerce framework for pervasive computing environments in which the components can dynamically join and disjoin a virtual market is also introduced. This f...

This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral investment agreement, expropriation triggers an investment stop by the single MNE. Under a multilateral agreement, expropriation leads to a joint reaction by all MNEs. Switching to such a regime increases worldwide FDI a...

I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations, a common means of exchange whose strategic complexity has hindered previous modeling efforts. Multilateral negotiations occur in numerous settings in which one party wishes to trade with one of several others, but for concreteness I consider a buyer facing multiple sellers offering potentially different amounts...

In multilateral enforcement, a player who cheats on one partner is punished by many partners. But renegotiation might subvert the threat of multilateral punishment. We consider renegotiation proofness in multilateral enforcement games with public monitoring, and also introduce the notion of “bilateral renegotiation proofness” for games with private monitoring. With public monitoring, renegotiat...

The paper reports an empirical study of the factors affecting burden sharing among OECD’s 22 DAC members in ‘bankrolling’ the multilateral aid agencies. These are the UN agencies, World Bank’s IDA and non-IDA programmes, regional development banks, European Community, and other multilateral agencies that include the Global Environmental Facility and the Montreal Protocol on environment. Annual ...

We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with verifiable multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost selle...