In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Cred...

Social learning has been shown to be an evolutionarily adaptive strategy, but can be implemented via many different cognitive mechanisms. Sensitivity to statistical dependency in the behavior of other people is a factor that discriminates between possible mechanisms: simple rule based strategies may be unaffected by dependency, while more sophisticated social learning strategies should take it ...

What can it mean for preferences to be rational when transitivity or completenss are not assumed? In this paper we provide a framework and a set of conditions to deal with this question. We provide representation results in terms of a pair of functions, a utility function and a vagueness function.

In this paper, we examine a trust-based framework for promoting honesty in e-marketplaces that relies on buyers forming social networks to share reputation ratings of sellers and sellers rewarding the buyers that are most respected within their social networks. We explore how sellers reason about expected future profit when offering particular rewards for buyers. We theoretically prove that in ...

We argue that arbitrage is limited if rational traders face uncertainty about when their peers will exploit a common arbitrage opportunity. This synchronization risk—which is distinct from noise trader risk and fundamental risk—arises in our model because arbitrageurs become sequentially aware of mispricing and they incur holding costs. We show that rational arbitrageurs ‘‘time the market’’ rat...

A Salience Theory of Choice Errors We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a ‘consideration set’ prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives)...

The optimal decision for an agent to make at a given game situation often depends on the decisions that other agents make at the same time. Rational agents will try to find a stable equilibrium before taking an action. Rational agents can use the negotiation mechanism to reach the equilibrium. In the previous work, we proposed the communication actions of paying guarantee or compensation to con...

The great variety of users of the services available on the internet raised the problem of finding flexible forms of presentation and interaction, which depend on the specific user's characteristics and needs. In this article we present an approach to adaptation, which exploits the reasoning capabilities of a rational agent. The key idea, which makes this approach orthogonal to personalization ...

We study games in which players search for an optimal action profile. All action profiles are either a success, with a payoff of one, or a failure, with a payoff of zero. Players do not know the location of success profiles. Instead each player is privately informed about the marginal distribution of success profiles over his actions. We characterize optimal joint search strategies. ∗ This is a...

The missing of an appropriate semantics of agent communication languages is one of the most challenging issues of contemporary AI. Although several approaches to this problem exist, none of them is really suitable for dealing with agent autonomy, which is the decisive property of artificial agents. This work introduces a novel approach to the semantics of agent communication, which combines the...