There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This ...

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are s...

The demand for children and for children’s consumption goods have been central themes in the economics of the family. Most economic studies of these topics are based on theory that would apply equally well to the demand for pets and the derived demand for pet food. Children are assumed to have no decisionmaking authority and hence their preferences are assumed to have no bearing on economic out...

Chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) is sustained by a rare population of primitive, quiescent, BCR-ABL+ cells and represents an excellent example of a malignancy in which tumor-initiating cells represent the key to disease eradication. CML is also the first malignancy for which targeted therapy has replaced conventional chemotherapy. Within a vast excess of proliferating progenitor cells that expres...

The human tendency to impose costs on those who have behaved antisocially towards third parties (third-party punishment) has a formative influence on societies, yet very few studies of the development of this tendency exist. In most studies where young children have punished, participants have imposed costs on puppets, leaving open the question as to whether young children punish in real third-...

This paper examines Allocators’ willingness to reward and punish their paired Recipients. Recipients only compete in a skill-testing contest, the outcome of which determines the size of the surplus. In the dictator game, Allocators reward skillful Recipients, but punish unskillful ones only modestly. The punishment effect is mitigated by the belief held by some Allocators that effort is the app...

The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. Varying treatments of a voluntary contributions experiment, we find that availability of higher-order punishment opportu...