Quantum game theory is a rapidly evolving subject that extends beyond physics. In this research work, schematic picture of quantum has been provided with the help famous Prisoners’ Dilemma, where both prisoners possess an entangled qubit. Increasing payoffs prisoners, introduces new Nash equilibrium. It considered shared qubits may interact environment, which bath simple harmonic oscillators. T...

Many previous works on quantum games are based on maximally entangled states. In this Letter, we investigate the correlations between entanglement and quantum games. For the particular case of the quantum prisoners’ dilemma, the property of the game changes fascinatingly with the variation of entanglement of the game’s state.  2001 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.

We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2015) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of otherregarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993).

The notion of Berge equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium, which has its theoretical basis in fixed point theorems. We point out parallel but novel results for the Berge theory and also show many illustrative examples. Some relation to the prisoners' dilemma is shown as well. The results here generalize those of Radjef and the authors. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners’ dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well. We find a quantum version of this repeated game where the players decide to cooperate in the first stage while knowing that both will defect in the second.

A setup is proposed to play a quantum version of the famous bimatrix game of Prisoners’ Dilemma. Multi-slit electron diffraction with each player’s pure strategy consisting of opening one of the two slits at his/her disposal are essential features of the setup. Instead of entanglement the association of waves with travelling material objects is suggested as another resource to play quantum games.

The scale and complexity of human cooperation is an important and unresolved evolutionary puzzle. This article uses the finitely repeated n person Prisoners' Dilemma game to illustrate how sapience can greatly enhance group-selection effects and lead to the evolutionary stability of cooperation in large groups. This affords a simple and direct explanation of the human "exception".

We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2015) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of otherregarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993).

The paper presents an eye-tracking study of the decision making processes leading to the disjunction effect in Prisoners Dilemma games. The experimental results suggest a different information acquisition pattern between the situations in which the move of the opponent is known and not known, respectively. The result is consistent with a complexity based explanation of the problem.

Simulations of complex systems models provide a numerical laboratory for studying emergent spatial phenomena. We report on simulations of the 2dimensional spatial prisoners’ dilemma with both 4and 8-neighbour playoffs. We identify non-monotonic dependence of the convergent population of defectors with the variation of defection temptation reward in the 8-neighbour system. We present somemicrosc...