To interact successfully, individuals must not only recognize one another as intentional agents driven primarily by internal mental states, but also possess a system for making reliable and useful inferences about the nature of those beliefs, feelings, goals, and dispositions. The ability to make such mental state inferences (i.e., to mentalize or mindread) is the central accomplishment of huma...

An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism’s sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formati...

The Estonian NEO-FFI was administered to 2650 Estonian adolescents (1420 girls and 1230 boys) aged from 12 to 18 years and attending 6th, 8th, 10th, or 12th grade at secondary schools all over Estonia. Although the mean levels of personality traits of Estonian adolescents were quite similar to the respective scores of Estonian adults, there was a developmental gap in Agreeableness and Conscient...

In this paper, we embark on the complicated discussion about nature of vice in Virtue Ethics through a twofold approach: first, by taking seriously claim that virtues (and certain flavours vices) are genuinely dispositional features possessed agents, and secondly, employing pluralistic attitude borrowed from Battaly’s pluralism (2008). Through these lenses, identify three varieties viciousness:...

The notion that all mental acts, all mental processes and dispositions have specific neural correlates has become much easier to explore in the past 15 years with the development of PET scanning and especially functional MRI. We can now, for example, demonstrate activity in the visual cortex when a subject views a test object, and we can pick up similar activity if we ask the subject to imagine...

We reply to recent papers by John Turri and Ben Bronner, who criticise the dispositionalised Nozickian tracking account we discuss in “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.” We argue that the account we suggested can handle the problems raised by Turri and Bronner. In the course of responding to Turri and Bronner’s objections, we draw three general lessons for theories of epistemic dispositions: that...

Although this definition is open to decisive objections, most of which are not new, NCA is not yet dead. There are still those of us who ask, on the presupposition that NCA or something very similar is the correct analysis of dispositions, whether dispositions can explain their manifestations, or whether the bearers of nothing but dispositional properties can fill space, or whether colours are ...

In an earlier paper in these pages, we explored the puzzling link between dispositions and conditionals. First, we rehearsed the standard counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis and the refined conditional analysis defended by David Lewis. Second, we attacked a tempting response to these counterexamples: what we called the ―getting specific strategy‖. Third, we presented a series of ...