Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal’s evaluation is private information, but she can provide some justifications by sending a costly message. Indeed, it is optimal for the principal to explain her evaluation to the agent if and only if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification guarantees the agent that the principal has not distorted ...

Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers’ Motivation and Production Technology The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially increa...

The value of stock-based compensation is typically taxed as ordinary income to the employee at vesting, but subsequent gains on the stock are capital gains. I examine whether it is ever optimal for an employee to accelerate the payment of ordinary income tax in order for subsequent gains to be taxed at the lower capital gains rate. The employee may accomplish this, for example, by exercising a ...

Individual and Job-Based Determinants of Performance Appraisal: Evidence from Germany We investigate the use of performance appraisal (PA) in German Firms. First, we derive hypotheses on individual and job based determinants of PA usage. Based on a representative German data set on individual employees, we test these hypotheses and also explore the impact of PA on performance pay and further ca...

Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual’s perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule ...

Employees exposed to high involvement management (HIM) practices have higher subjective wellbeing, fewer accidents but more short absence spells than “like” employees not exposed to HIM. These results are robust to extensive work, wage and sickness absence history controls. We highlight the possibility of higher short-term absence in the presence of HIM because it is more demanding than standar...

This paper studies the e¤ect of changes in foreign competition on the structure of compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competition as import penetration, and use tari¤s and exchange rates as instrumental variables to estimate its causal e¤ect on pay. We …nd that higher foreign competition leads to more incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases ...

This paper investigates the effect of performance feedback on productivity in a company where workers operate in teams and receive a bonus that depends on both individual worker and team productivity. To address this issue, we employ weekly productivity and administrative data obtained from the customer service centre of an insurance company. We find evidence that performance feedback given eac...

In perfectly competitive labour markets, there is a market for non-material job amenities in which workers’ willingness to pay for these goods implies that workers accept compensating wage differentials, such that jobs with better working conditions should have lower wages. In labour market characterised by frictions, workers’ wages typically depend also on firm productivity. However many job c...

Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These ‘conformists' have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too. When there is asymmetric inform...