What is the ultimate justification for private property rights? How do they first legitimately come into being? Both Dominiak and I reject usual explanation: existence based upon a grant of executive privilege, will king or democratic legislature. For this leaves open issue why either them have right to rights in place. claims prior possession. In present paper criticize that alternative, defen...

We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals’ information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find that there is more redistribution behind a veil of ignorance than under full information. However, th...

When the First Amendment was ratified in 1791 many Americans still regarded trenchant criticism of govemment, its officers, or policies to be criminally punishable "seditious libel." Not until bitter controversy ignited by Sedition Act 1798 did formulate a theory political expression republic that undercut arguments justifying prosecution for seditious libel. The result new libenarianism with r...

Abstract Because an agent’s constitutive luck may seem to preclude free will, it moral responsibility. An agent is basically morally responsible for performing action A at time t only if there another possible world with the same past up and laws of nature in which does not perform . compatibilist can solve problem responsibility without worrying about basic According compatibilism, determinism...

Utilitarianism is an ethical system. John Stuart Mill’s use of Utilitarianism to determine what is just and what is injustice may seem natural, but I will argue that the relationship between justice and ethics and the role that Utilitarianism might play in the development of ideas of justice is more complicated than it initially appears. Despite these difficulties, Utilitarianism’s consequentia...

Many opponents of free-will libertarianism argue that libertarian free agency is unintelligible. The aim of my talk is to answer them by suggesting that a coherent conception of libertarian freedom is possible if (and, possibly, only if) we adopt dispositionalism as the explanatory framework of human agency. My argument proceeds as follows. First, I classify the existing explanations of human a...