This paper focuses on the current issues linked to the goals of banking regulation and supervision. The banking supervision policy carried out in transition countries – Central and Eastern Europe – takes into account a range of specific phenomena. The key distinctive factor of banking supervision and regulation in these economies was until recent the absence of a market-oriented banking system....

Abstract This paper discusses the dynamics of bank regulation in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region during period before 1990s and post describes trends regulatory measures between 1995 2017 using updated databases World Bank’s Bank Regulation Supervision Surveys. Before 1990s, majority SSA countries was inadequate that led to multiple occurrences banking crises. As a result, many introduced fina...

Using both bankand country-level data on banking sectors from 70 countries over the period 1992–2006, this paper empirically investigates the joint homeand host-country effects of banking market structure, macroeconomic condition, governance, and changes in bank supervision on foreign bank margins. We find that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks when they operate in a host co...

This paper analyses how the central bank's role in the monetary institutional setting can affect the unification process of the overall financial supervision architecture. Using indicators of monetary commitment and central bank independence, we claim that these legal proxies show an inverse link with financial supervision unification. Therefore, the trade off still holds between the supervisor...

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), in response to the recent financial crisis, has developed new stability rules aimed at preventing financial crises in the future. This paper uses the new Liquidity Ratio (LCR) and attempts to determine the impact of this ratio on the stability of the banking system. The objective of the LCR is to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidi...

We show that the regulation of bank lending practices is necessary for the optimal provision of private liquidity. In an environment in which bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors, we show that neither an unregulated banking system nor narrow banking can provide the socially e¢ cient amount of liquidity. If the bankers provided such an amount, then they would prefer to default on their...