We propose a system theoretic approach to select and stabilize the endemic equilibrium of an SIRS epidemic model in which decisions population strategically interacting agents determine transmission rate. Specifically, population’s recurrently revise their choices out set strategies that impact varying levels A payoff vector quantifying incentives provided by planner for each strategy, after de...

Direct ESS has some disadvantages, which are seen even in the case of repeated games when sequence stage ESSs may not constitute direct game. We present here refinement definition, eliminates these disadvantages and represents base for definition extensive form. The effectiveness this approach multistage n-person is shown metagame (this notion used first time), under relevant conditions, existe...

The evolutionary stability is a fundamental issue in single-criterion games. This paper considers the evolutionary stability in multicriteria games. Since a payoff is given by a vector, we provide several concepts which are equivalent in single-criterion games and investigate their hierarchical structure. On the other hand, Shapley has introduced concepts called a strong and a weak equilibrium....

Evolutionary game theory has grown into an active area of research that bridges concepts from biology, evolution, nonlinear dynamics, and game theory. The mechanisms necessary to conduct an evolutionary analysis of games are presented. Relations between evolutionary stable strategies and Nash equilibria are considered. Replicator dynamics are developed and applied to three relevant games. The a...

Games have always been a popular test bed for artificial intelligence techniques. Game developers are always in constant search for techniques that can automatically create computer games minimizing the developer's task. In this work we present an evolutionary strategy based solution towards the automatic generation of two player board games. To guide the evolutionary process towards games, whi...