Abstract Transactions of any complexity between buyers and sellers are supported by long-term contracts these inevitably incomplete. We propose an approach for overcoming contractual incompleteness based on the idea that most people inclined to follow widely accepted social norms, such as being fair-minded acting with integrity. suggest this tendency can be reinforced if norms incorporated into...

Bu araştırmanın amacı, iş karakteristiklerinin bireysel performansı üzerindeki etkisini özellikle sağlık çalışanları açısından belirlemektir. Zor şartlar altında çalışan personelinin hangi performans türü üzerinde karakteristiğinin etkili olduğu önemli bir bilgidir. Araştırmada veri toplama yöntemi olarak anket tekniğinden yararlanılmıştır. Araştırma, kamu ve özel hastanelerden tesadüfi seçilen...

By building on theoretical work by Mills and Schumann (1985) and Ungern-Sternberg (1990) this paper provides evidence on the determinants of two dimensions of flexibility, the flexibility in adjusting aggregate output over time ("tactical flexibility") as well as the ability to switch quickly between products ("operational flexibility"). Econometric analysis of a sample of 40.000 farms in Upper...

We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to how learning members of an organization might cope with the simu...

How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage From an employer’s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. We experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that – within a reasonable framework – productive and destructive activities are not influenced neither by the number of ...

This chapter surveys the new institutional economics, a rapidly growing literature combining economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology and anthropology to understand social, political and commercial institutions. This literature tries to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes they serve, how they change and how they may be reformed. Following conven...

Theoretical and empirical models explore the effects of a gender equity regulation imposed on an athletic director at a nonprofit university. The behavioral model predicts a decrease in the total number of sports teams and a net decrease in the number of men’s teams, suggesting that the regulation has unintended consequences. The empirical analysis confirms the theory and identifies the size an...

The paper studies a general model of hold-up in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modelled as an infinite-horizon non-cooperative bargaining game then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient equilibrium will generally exist. The contract gives authority to one party to set the terms of trade and g...

Prepared for the Handbook Of New Institutional Economics. Focusing on firm behavior, the paper examines the collapse of socialist institutions, the building of capitalist institutions, changing firm boundaries, transactional governance, corporate governance, and use of the legal system. The contrast between law's use in transactions and its relative ineffectiveness in corporate governance sugge...

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment....